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ABSTRACT 
 
Construction clients often use financial incentives to encourage stakeholder motivation and 
commitment to voluntary higher-order project goals. Despite the increased use of financial 
incentives, there is little literature addressing means of optimizing outcomes. Using a case 
study methodology, the examination of a successful Australian construction project 
demonstrates the features of a positively geared procurement approach that promotes the 
effectiveness of financial incentives. The research results show that if the incentive system is 
perceived to be fair and is applied to reward exceptional performance, and not to manipulate, 
then contractors are more likely to be positively motivated.   
 
Keywords: goal commitment, financial incentives, contracts, motivation, construction 
projects, built environment. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of advanced contracting options such as financial incentives has been identified as a 
way to promote increased motivation and commitment in construction projects (Bresnen & 
Marshall, 2000). A financial incentive built into a contract can act as a reward system based 
on a contractor’s ability to satisfy specific cost or performance objectives (Washington, 
1997). Similarly, according to Bower, Ashby, Gerald, and Smyk (2002, p. 43), financial 
incentives aim to “simply take advantage of a contractor’s general objective to maximize their 
profits by giving them the opportunity to earn a greater profit if they perform the contract 
efficiently.”  This can potentially be achieved by having contract agents (including project 
consultants) share in the client’s success from the project. It is generally accepted within the 
incentive literature that, to ensure that an adversarial relationship does not occur between the 
contracting parties, the incentive systems should focus on positive incentives, rather than on 
penalties (Lahdenpera & Koppinen, 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, there has been very little analysis of the means to promote financial incentive 
effectiveness in a construction project environment. The limited literature that exists is 
dominated by Bresnen and Marshall (2000), who argue that there are limitations to the use of 
incentives. They point out that financial incentives will not automatically result in high levels 
of motivation and commitment. They suggest instead that the overall procurement approach 
needs to be complementary, although little detail is provided in terms of how this might be 
achieved. This paper responds to this gap in the literature by exploring the research question 
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“What are the specific project drivers that enhance financial incentive mechanism (FIM) 
effectiveness?”  
 
This paper examines a very successful large Australian infrastructure project completed in 
2005, to identify the positive motivation drivers that encouraged stakeholders to achieve 
above “business as usual” (BAU) goals. These are voluntary higher-order goals that exceed 
base contract commitments. On this project, the above-BAU goals equated with the FIM 
goals, and as these were achieved, stakeholders were allocated the full incentive pool.  
 
The first section of this paper provides background information on the range of financial 
incentive design options in construction contracts and discusses the complexities associated 
with implementing incentives into a highly interdependent project environment. This 
theoretical background will inform the subsequent case study discussion. 
 
 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
 
Financial incentives as part of construction contracts are typically either cost-plus incentives 
or performance incentives (Bubshait, 2003). They aim to promote motivation by offering 
either a profit-sharing arrangement or a performance bonus, respectively, to the contract agent 
for above-minimum performance standards.  
 
Cost-plus Incentives 
In cost-plus incentive contracts, the client’s target cost is introduced into a reimbursable 
contract and acts as the fulcrum around which the incentive mechanism is driven.  As this 
incentive type aims to promote favorable project cost outcomes, savings achieved below the 
target cost are split between the contractor and client based on a predetermined share profile 
(Broome & Perry, 2002). The aim of this arrangement is to motivate the contractor and client 
to work together to minimize actual costs, as the contractor is able to  maximize their profit 
margin by sharing the benefits of reduced project cost, and the client is motivated to minimize 
the total cost paid out (Broome & Perry, 2002).  
 
Performance Bonus Incentives 
The second type of financial incentive used in construction contracts is the performance 
bonus incentive. These can be used in fixed price and cost-plus contract types but, depending 
on the project goals, have been argued to work best when used in cost-plus contracts 
(Berends, 2000). The main objective of performance bonus incentives is to motivate the 
contract agent by providing them with a financial bonus in addition to their prescribed fee for 
exceeding minimum acceptable levels of performance; and distribution is generally based on 
evaluations undertaken after performance has been achieved (Washington, 1997). 
Performance bonus incentives can be used to motivate the contract agents in many areas other 
than cost, which is usually more simply managed by the cost-plus incentive contract 
mechanism. Performance bonus incentives are applied to a wide variety of areas, such as 
schedule (e.g., project completion prior to target dates) and technical performance (e.g., 
achievement of safety and quality assessment targets). 
 
Specifically, schedule incentives offer stakeholders a bonus for project completion earlier 
than the target dates and are usually based on a predetermined amount paid for each day of 
early completion, and are closely linked to project costs, since time delays usually increase 
costs (Arditi & Yasamis, 1998). Therefore, schedule incentives should be negotiated 
concurrently with cost incentives, as incentives encouraging early completion will reduce 
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construction costs. Scheduling risks can be high if the scope is likely to change during the 
project and if the impact of these changes cannot be predicted with reasonable accuracy. 
Thus, the level of stakeholder risk in committing to the schedule objectives should be 
consistent with the reward offered (DAU, 2001). 
 
Financial incentives can also be used to influence the quality of project outcomes in 
construction.   A quality performance bonus works on the premise that contractors are offered 
additional profit if they are able to achieve predetermined quality performance levels. When 
assessing quality, standardized systems should be used and should be applied selectively to 
the most important aspects of the work (Lahdenpera & Koppinen, 2003). However, a major 
problem with quality assessment is that it can be subjective and difficult to measure 
(Washington, 1997). 
 
Quality performance measurement tools have been developed by public clients with a high 
level of repeat construction, such as those used by Singapore’s Construction Quality 
Assessment System (CONQAS) and Hong Kong’s Performance Assessment Scoring System 
(PASS) for public housing (Tam, Deng, Zeng, & Ho, 2000). Criteria may include quality of 
workmanship, flaws and defect rectification, functioning of design and implementation, and 
amount of rework. Measuring standards should be based on objective measurements rather 
than relying on subjective assessments (Tam et al., 2000) to ensure that there is a clear 
definition of performance requirements and units of measurement.   
 
Multiple Incentive Arrangements 
Occasionally, clients offer a multiple incentive arrangement, which combines cost-plus and 
performance incentive arrangements (Table 1). Generally, performance is measured on the 
cost savings made below a target cost combined with the achievement of set performance 
goals (single or incremental goals). This arrangement maximizes the opportunities to 
incentivize all areas of performance and should be balanced to reflect client project priorities. 
Financial incentives can be applied at the organizational and/or individual levels. A major 
problem in selecting an appropriate incentive system to motivate at either level is that, in 
environments where team members’ tasks are highly interdependent (such as in a construction 
project), individual output may be almost indistinguishable from group output (Howard, 
Turban, & Hurley, 2002). Organizational incentives are thus used more often than individual 
incentives in the construction context. 
 
One unfortunate drawback to organizational incentives is the potential to induce what 
economists call free-riding behavior—or the reduction of effort due to the reduced 
accountability in group performance. For tasks that require very little cooperative behavior, 
group-based rewards will produce lower levels of performance than with highly 
interdependent tasks, due to the potential for free-riding behavior (Wageman & Baker, 1997). 
On the other hand, in a highly interdependent context such as a construction project, free-
riding behavior is more difficult. Team member contribution is very interdependent and 
therefore highly visible to the entire team, potentially making cheating difficult. Further, 
organizational incentives can help unify the focus on multiple goals among team members, 
encouraging mutual cooperation and increasing the level of commitment to their individual 
goals.  
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 Profit  sharing 
incentives 
Performance incentives Multiple incentive mix 
Performa
nce 
measure
ment 
Incentive measurement is 
based on construction 
cost savings around a 
target construction 
sum—i.e., if actual 
construction sum (ACS) 
comes in below target 
construction sum (TCS), 
savings are distributed 
among participants. 
Usually the share of 
savings is capped. 
Incentive measurement is 
based on achievement of 
set performance criteria 
(key performance goals).  
Performance can be 
assessed throughout the 
project or at completion.  
Incentive measurement 
can be based on: 1) cost 
savings made below a 
TCS; and 2) achievement 
of set performance 
targets that determine the 
allocation of incentive 
pool. 
Reward 
allocation 
Share ratio determined 
by straight percentage 
(%) agreement or 
distribution function—
e.g., the greater the 
savings, the greater the 
percentage share on 
offer. 
Incentive allocation 
sourced from a separate 
bonus pool (usually built 
into the project budget). 
It can be allocated based 
on a single goal or on 
incremental goals.  
Incentive allocation is 
usually based on a share 
of cost savings and an 
incentive pool amount 
for the achievement of 
set performance goals 
(single or incremental 
goals). 
Incentive 
options 
Profit-sharing is based on 
a wide range of share 
profiles (e.g., 50/50 
percentage capped) 
aligned with project risks 
and opportunities. 
 
Performance incentives 
can include benchmarks 
in areas such as:  
 schedule 
performance 
 operation 
 non-disturbance 
 safety 
 design integrity 
 quality 
There are many 
variations in the 
application of this 
incentive type.  
Many variations in the 
combination of both 
profit-sharing (cost 
outcome) incentives and 
performance incentives. 
However, the client 
should ensure that goals 
do not conflict.  
Positives Provides motivation for 
the client and contractor 
to work together and 
minimize actual project 
costs. 
Can be relatively easy to 
manage due to an 
objective measurement 
system and distribution at 
the conclusion of the 
project.  
A wide range of 
incentive goals can be 
used to align project 
priorities and improve 
contractor performance. 
Argued to be best used in 
cost-plus incentive 
contracts. 
Maximizes the 
opportunities to 
incentivize all areas of 
performance based on 
project priorities.  
Multiple incentive goals 
should be balanced to 
reflect project priorities.  
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Negatives Potential for “moral 
hazard” problems in 
other project 
performance areas (i.e., 
contractors prioritizing 
cost savings to the 
potential detriment to 
other areas such as 
quality and safety. 
Requires ongoing 
management and 
potentially high upfront 
costs to develop and 
measure incentive 
performance. Care must 
be taken not to 
overemphasize a 
particular goal to prevent 
imbalances in contractor 
priorities. 
Can be complicated to 
administer.  Requires 
ongoing management and 
upfront costs to develop 
and measure the 
performance incentives. 
 
 
Table 1: Key financial incentive designs  
 
In summary, there are a wide range of FIM options that can be applied to a construction 
contract. These include profit-sharing arrangements in cost-plus incentive contracts, built-in 
bonus performance provisions, and financial incentive mixes. Also, there is the option of 
individual- and/or team-based incentives to consider based on the level of task 
interdependence and individual impact on organizational and inter-organizational 
performance. The suitability of a specific option is clearly context-dependent.  
 
 
METHODS 
 
This paper addresses the research problem that project managers have little information 
available to them on how to incorporate incentives in their projects (as a part of an overall 
procurement strategy) nor do they fully understand the impact of incentives on project 
motivation (Rose, 2008). In response to this, a case study is employed to identify the positive 
motivation drivers that can underpin the successful achievement of the above-BAU incentive 
goals. By identifying the positive motivation drivers, conclusions can be drawn about the 
impact of FIMs on motivation and about procurement initiatives that can promote their 
effectiveness.   
 
A case study methodology was chosen to explore the research question “What are the specific 
project drivers that enhance FIM effectiveness?” This was seen as the best method given the 
complexity of project environments, and the need for in-depth understanding of the dynamics 
surrounding project-based motivation in order to effectively scope and identify drivers. This 
case study method promised to result in more valid and reliable findings than a broader 
quantitative approach.  Although there are acknowledged shortcomings with case studies in 
terms of external validity due to the small and selective samples, the aim of the current 
research was to derive analytical generalization and not statistical generalization of the 
motivation drivers impacting on incentive goal performance (Yin, 2003). The general themes 
and patterns identified form the background for future statistical research. 
 
Case study findings were triangulated across the following data sources: semi-structured face-
to-face interviews, project and contractual documentation (including project briefs and 
minutes from meetings), industry publications, and a site visit. Extensive preliminary data 
were collected, which helped shape the interviews. The interviews were semi-structured, with 
questions based on a set of four motivation indicators derived from organizational 
management and motivational theory literature. The indicators comprised:  
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Goal Commitment (Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987). 
Commitment implies extension of effort over time toward the achievement of a difficult 
goal, culminating in its attainment. Goal commitment refers to the determination and 
motivation to try for a goal; in the case of this research, the performance goal associated 
with the financial reward. To clearly define this indicator and its elements, Hollenbeck 
and Klein’s (1987) model of goal commitment was used. They applied an expectancy 
theory framework first developed by Vroom (1964), and expanded by Porter and Lawler 
(1968), to study goal commitment and determined a set of antecedents and consequences 
of commitment to difficult goals. 
 
Distributive Justice (Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal, 1976).  
A financial incentive system should be set at an appropriate intensity to fairly compensate 
for the agent’s risk and to promote effort. Incentive intensity, according to economic 
motivation theories, is a major determinant of an agent’s level of effort in an incentive 
contract. This is because higher intensity increases the agent’s margin in response to their 
increased effort (Zenger, 2000). Therefore, the reward must be great enough to motivate 
the agent (based on the effort/cost to achieve), but should not exceed the value of the 
benefits to the principal. This is also supported by distributive justice and equity theory, 
where, if the size of the financial reward does not fairly equate with the desired level of 
performance, it can fail to motivate. 
 
Process Fairness (Colquitt, 2001; Thibaut & Walker 1975). 
According to justice theory, based on Adams’ (1963) equity theory, process fairness 
focuses on the fairness of the procedures that are used to make distribution decisions. In 
the context of this research, process fairness refers to the fairness of the performance 
measurement process that determines the distribution of the financial reward. Procedural 
fairness perceptions in groups need to be stronger as task interdependence increases 
(Colquitt, 2004). Therefore, as task interdependence between project stakeholders is high 
in complex construction projects, it is predicted that procedural justice may be a very 
important requirement for maintaining motivation and commitment towards project goals. 
 
Interactional Justice and Reciprocity (Fehr & Falk, 2002; Bies & Moag, 1986).  
Interactional justice relates to the aspects of the communication process between decision 
makers and recipients, such as honesty and respect. This can relate to treatment from a 
supervisor or source of justice such as a client representative. In this research, it is argued 
that interactional justice predicts a negative reaction to poor treatment by a 
client/contractor representative. Interactional justice principles are closely supported by 
economic reciprocity theory (see Fehr & Falk, 2002), which states that the agent prefers 
an environment of fairness, where the principal’s (client’s) reward intention is perceived 
to be honorable. Where creativity and agent discretion are important, structuring financial 
reward systems as a symbolic gesture of trust can promote reciprocal behavior and 
restriction of opportunistic instincts (Kreps, 1997). 
 
Rose (2008) provides further information on the theoretical development of these motivation 
indicators, which were used to structure interview questions. The interviewees comprised 
eight senior managers; two from each of four key stakeholder types (client, head contractor, 
consultants, and subcontractors), who were heavily involved in the procurement and delivery 
of the case project. All interviews were in-person, ranged from 60 to 90 minutes in duration, 
and were based on structured and unstructured questions. Interview data was captured by 
note-taking and digital recording and transcribed verbatim in order to develop an accurate and 
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comprehensive database. Informal field notes were also taken during site visits and the 
interviews. 
 
Raw interview data was reviewed using content analysis. This involved manually aggregating 
and categorizing responses from the interview transcripts and the secondary data to identify 
the key motivation drivers. The identification and refinement of driver categories was 
achieved by inductive coding. The primary data amounted to approximately 8,000 words 
contained in interview transcripts. The coding process involved interpretation of each 
interviewee’s transcript, organized around the four motivation indicators. Each coding 
category was revised and refined until clear lines could be drawn between the motivation 
drivers. Care was taken to identify driver categories that covered all instances, were limited in 
number, and were mutually exclusive. Due to the subjective nature of content analysis, an 
expert panel was formed to test content analysis accuracy and ensure inadvertent bias was 
minimized. The category allocations of the three expert panel members reflected over 80% 
accuracy, providing evidence of the reliability of the coding. The case study presented in this 
paper was selected in a purposive manner, as it represents an example of the successful design 
and implementation of a financial incentive system as part of the overall project procurement 
approach.   
 
CASE PROJECT BACKGROUND 
 
The project was a large Australian government acute care hospital redevelopment with a 
design and construction cost of AU$91.2 million, completed in 2005. This redevelopment was 
in response to a review of the existing facilities that were identified as not meeting their 
operational requirements and health service delivery models. This project included the 
demolition of much of the outdated infrastructure and replacement of all hospital wards. The 
hospital was designed to accommodate future growth.  
 
The hospital was operational throughout the construction stage, and the project required the 
flexibility to meet changes in operational requirements and ongoing commissioning of new 
wards. The project was completed in two major phases, with a minor completion stage for 
finishing off the buildings.  A unique aspect of the delivery approach was that Furniture, 
Fixtures, and Equipment (FFE) procurement was assigned to the managing contractor as well 
as construction management; traditionally FFE would be outsourced to a specialist contractor.  
 
At the master planning stage, the project had been classed as a standard “lump sum” 
arrangement. A team of consultants including the architect (primary consultant), mechanical 
and civil engineers (secondary consultants), and a cost planner had been appointed under a 
lump sum arrangement to do master planning work. Under a traditional “lump sum” contract, 
the client appoints design consultants for the full extent of design and documentation. Once 
documentation is complete, a contractor is engaged by the government client under a lump 
sum contract and through a competitive tender process, to construct the building based on the 
completed design. Thus, the contractor is responsible for, and carries the risk for, construction 
cost (based on the agreed-upon contract sum) and construction schedule.  
 
After several months, the client representatives identified the project as high risk and it was 
decided that a “relationship-based” procurement approach would be more suitable. Also, due 
to its large size and complexity, the project was identified as a possible exemplar project; with 
an objective to showcase innovative procurement initiatives.  
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Two key components defined the “relationship-based” approach in this project. They 
comprised a Managing Contractor (Construction Management) contract and an innovative 
stakeholder management arrangement. 
 
First, the contractual conditions agreed to between the government client and contractor 
significantly influenced the project relationship. Under a Managing Contractor (Construction 
Management) form of contract, the contractor is generally appointed under a competitive two-
stage tender arrangement (via price and non-price selection criteria), to provide input into 
design and documentation and is contracted to manage the construction process. They do not 
take on the risks associated with construction documentation changes but still provide input 
into the design process as a consultancy service. It was anticipated that their input would 
improve design constructability, thereby decreasing construction risks. 
 
In Australia, this is sometimes called a “junior” managing contractor role, as the government 
client appoints the design consultants for the full extent of their services, but they are not put 
under the responsibility of the contractor prior to construction. Under this contract, the 
managing contractor is responsible for the construction trade packages, which are managed 
through an open-book tender process. Generally, the managing contractor is appointed under 
a cost-plus arrangement that includes a construction management fee arrangement (CM 
professional fee), where actual cost-overrun risks are jointly managed by the project team on 
behalf of the client. Under the contract conditions, the contractor was required to act “in good 
faith” in maintaining actual costs within the client’s budget. The government client believed 
that this arrangement would provide better value for money than under a lump-sum contract 
(where the contractor is solely responsible for the construction of completed design). 
Generally, the project stakeholders agreed that the use of a financial incentive was suited to 
this form of contract because of the requirement to motivate the contractor and consultants to 
deliver performance beyond their professional management fee and minimize project costs 
below a target construction sum (TCS), through a value engineering processes. 
 
The managing contractor contract conditions set the foundation for improved stakeholder 
relationships through a willingness of the client to jointly manage project time, cost, and 
quality risks. However, a key factor in the success of the chosen “relationship-based” 
procurement approach in the case study was the innovative stakeholder management strategy 
that operationalized the joint approach to managing the project.      
 
The stakeholder management strategy developed for the project aimed to align the project 
parties’ commercial objectives with the project objectives, further mitigate the client’s design 
and construction risks (through closer integration of the project team), and improve decision-
making and problem resolution. This innovative strategy was first proposed by the 
government client representatives in response to several failed projects, where failure was 
partly attributed to adversarial relationships and a lack of teamwork and stakeholder cohesion. 
Although a management framework was in place that defined organizational responsibilities, 
many details of how the project would be managed were developed in the initial project 
relationship workshops. All of the major project parties including the key subcontractors 
attended the initial workshops, which aimed to define stakeholders and their expectations and 
help develop common goals for the team. 
  
A key feature of the stakeholder management strategy was the abolition of the traditional 
hierarchical structure in favor of a “round table” approach. The consultants, managing 
contractor, and key subcontractors were engaged directly to the government agency 
responsible for the project. This was intended to promote honesty and openness in project 
meetings between the major parties. The project was managed by two primary teams, 
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comprising an executive leadership team (ELT) and an integrated management team (IMT). 
Theses teams involved all of the major stakeholders and their leaders. The IMT included the 
individuals from the major parties who were in charge of the day-to-day management of the 
project, while the ELT involved the higher-level management personnel who were 
responsible for the holistic direction of the project, much like a steering committee. It was 
intended that if project issues could not be resolved at the IMT, they would be delegated to 
the ELT. Workgroups were formed within the IMT to identify above-BAU benchmarks and to 
measure and reward performance in the key project priority areas. These workgroups were 
formally established during the design development and documentation stages. The end-users 
were involved in the ELT and IMT, to provide their input to the building’s functionality 
requirements. 
 
In summary, the consultant team was appointed during the conceptual design stage, to take 
the project to the design development stage. The managing contractor was appointed during 
design development to provide input to the consultants on the design, particularly concerning 
constructability. The key subcontractors were appointed during design documentation to 
further enhance the design and negotiate their subcontract tender price. A relationship 
consultant was appointed during the project’s conceptual stage to establish and formalize the 
management structure, facilitate relationship workshops, and provide relationship coaching. 
The management structure and the stages of appointment are illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  Project management structure and engagement stages.  
 
ELT = executive leadership team; IMT = integrated management team. 
 
 
The managing contractor tender process was managed by all members of the initial project 
team (client representatives and consultant team including the relationship consultant and cost 
planner) with equal input in selection. It involved a two-stage tender process: first, to assess 
tendered construction estimates, and second, to assess non-price criteria.   
 
As with the managing contractor, the consultants were employed directly by the client under a 
professional fee arrangement. Notably, the cost planner was assigned directly to the client’s 
risk manager to ensure that the client had an independent third party to review all cost claims 
and monitor budget performance. The key subcontractors (mechanical, electrical, and 
intelligence/communication systems) were selected under a two-stage tender. First-stage 
selection was based on non-price and price criteria. These subcontractors assisted the 
consultants in the design documentation and in developing shop drawings. This gave them 
significant input to the design and the value engineering process. In the second stage, they 
were appointed to complete the trade package for the negotiated tender price. The remaining 
subcontractors were appointed to the managing contractor under a lump sum price 
arrangement. 
 
A key component of the procurement approach was the use of a performance-based financial 
incentive. The FIM was developed by the ELT members, who delegated the responsibility of 
its implementation to the IMT through the project workgroups. A capped financial incentive 
pool of AU$1.5 million was offered by the client and financed through the preservation of 
contingency amounts, which linked the client’s objectives to the cost outcomes on the project.  
 
The two contingency sums were the principal’s contingency and the design and construction 
contingency. The client representatives could spend the principal’s contingency on 
discretionary items outside the scope of the works, as they saw fit. The construction and 
design contingency could be used for project initiatives and for extra works as determined by 
the construction and design teams. If the team was able to preserve the design and 
construction contingency (cost performance), the FIM would be allocated at the conclusion of 
project according to performance in Ecological Sustainable Development (ESD), community 
relations, training, and program performance. The IMT decided that the financial incentive 
reward would be distributed to each team member based on their fee proportion.  
 
The IMT went through a workshop process to determine: first, how they could maximize 
project savings without impacting on functionality and develop the incentive pool, and 
second, how the FIM performance would be benchmarked and measured. They decided that 
40% of the incentive pool would be based on project outcomes, and 60% on cost outcomes. 
Therefore, if the team managed to secure an incentive pool from contingency savings while 
meeting all project objectives, 60% would be automatically distributed. The remaining 40% 
was made available if the project team achieved three out of the four project performance 
benchmarks. The ELT decided that there would only be positive financial incentives on the 
project. Thus, there were no negative incentives such as liquidated damages clauses in the 
contract.  
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The client, managing contractor, and consultant representatives all recognized that there 
would be significant pressure on the initial budget if the objectives of the project were to be 
met, especially for FFE. There had been miscalculations in the estimate of how much of the 
existing equipment could be reused and of expected market prices at the time of purchase for 
new equipment. The original budget estimate for FFE was 6% of the total project cost 
(approximately AU$4.2 million), but ultimately cost approximately AU$12 million. This 
budget shortfall placed pressure on the project team to recoup the required funds in project 
savings. In the end, the budget shortfall was met by extra funds from the client, but also 
through the savings made by the project team (value engineering recouped approximately 
AU$1.8 million) and an agreed redistribution of half of the incentive pool. 
 
Approximately halfway through the project, the incentive capped amount on offer was halved 
through negotiation between the stakeholders. This occurred when the client predicted that the 
project team would most probably achieve the AU$1.5 million in contingency savings, 
although at that stage, their final performance in the benchmarks had not been determined. As 
there were identified major shortfalls in the FFE budget, the client asked the project team to 
forgo half of their share (AU$750,000) of the FIM pool and redistribute it to the FFE budget. 
Although the client had a contractual obligation to pay the full incentive pool, the managing 
contractor and consultants agreed to the redistribution because of their commitment to the 
FFE outcomes. As a compromise, the client agreed to extensions of time, giving the team a 
greater chance to meet the program.  
 
By the conclusion of the project in May 2005, the project participants had achieved all of the 
budget and revised program, the ESD (recycling, water usage, and energy), community 
relations, and training benchmarks. Participants were paid the full AU$750,000 incentive 
according to their fee proportion. Another positive element for the major project parties was 
their automatic reappointment for Stage B of the hospital redevelopment. This was intended 
by the client as a reward for successfully meeting all project goals. This strategic 
reappointment was thought to be unprecedented in large government building projects in 
Australia.  
 
POSITIVE MOTIVATION DRIVERS 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the motivation drivers that were nominated by the majority of interviewees 
as contributing to the successful achievement of incentive goals on the project. The discussion 
of these drivers provides guidance for client project managers wishing to optimize the impact 
of financial incentives within an advanced procurement approach.  
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Figure 2: Positive motivation drivers. 
FIM = financial incentive mechanism; ELT = executive leadership team; IMT = integrated 
management team; ESD = ecological sustainable development. 
 
 
Management Structure  
The “round table” project management structure (facilitated through the monthly IMT and 
ELT project meetings) positively impacted on the project stakeholder commitment to the FIM 
goals. The meetings promoted the expectancy that the team could achieve the FIM goals, as 
each team member had an equal influence in the decisions that were made. The project team’s 
control of performance was also increased because the managing contractor and key 
subcontractors were involved in the design stages.  
 
Early Involvement 
Having the managing contractor and key subcontractors involved in the design development 
and documentation stages improved the project stakeholders’ ability to manage design and 
construction integration and to control construction costs (particularly for the managing 
contractor). This promoted goal commitment. This was particularly relevant in the value 
engineering exercises, where cost-saving design solutions were required to minimize 
Monthly FIM 
Workshops 
FIM 
Performance 
 
 Achievement of 
cost, revised 
program, ESD, 
community 
relations and 
training goals. 
Future Work 
Value-based 
Tender 
Equitable 
Risk 
Multiple FIM 
Goals 
 
Early 
Involvement 
Management 
Structure 
(IMT and ELT) 
FIM Goal 
Motivation 
Relationship 
Workshops 
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contingency spending, in order to build the financial incentive pool and recoup FFE budget 
shortfalls. 
 
Relationship Workshops 
The relationship workshops (including the initial breakthrough workshop and the ongoing 
relationship reviews) positively supported project relationships and promoted a “best for 
project” culture. This motivation driver, in combination with the project management 
structure, induced personal commitment to the deliverables on the project, beyond the 
organizational commitment, therefore increasing the attractiveness of FIM goal attainment. 
This personal commitment intensified the level of motivation induced through the FIM 
reward. Interviewees also expressed that the strong relational quality (i.e., the extent that the 
stakeholders feel confident and have trust in dealing with one another) formed on the project 
improved the perception that their client’s intentions were honorable.  
 
Value-based Tender   
The selection of the managing contractor and subcontractors on non-price criteria was a 
positive driver that promoted motivation towards the FIM goals. According to the managing 
contractor representatives, this value-based tender approach gave them a sense of 
commitment to their client. They hoped to show that they had been rightly selected and to 
uphold their reputation, thus improving the attractiveness of FIM goal attainment. They also 
stated that the open-book tender assessment, which involved the examination of profit and 
loss statements from their previous projects, broke down client misapprehension and helped 
develop trust.  The subcontractor representatives also said that their selection, based on a 
tentative subcontract price and ability to contribute to the design, improved the project team’s 
ability to manage the budget and identify cost-saving design options, promoting goal 
commitment.  
 
Future Work  
The project participants were strongly motivated by the potential for future work with the 
client. Therefore, they were driven to promote their reputation and achieve successful project 
delivery, increasing the attractiveness of FIM goal attainment. This driver was also related to 
the project participants’ perception that the client representatives valued their performance by 
recommending them for future projects. This potential reappointment for Stage B of the 
project was highly valued as a reward by the managing contractor and consultants. 
 
Monthly FIM Workshops  
The involvement of the contractors and consultants in the FIM development and performance 
measurement process (through the monthly FIM performance workshops) improved their 
motivation to achieve FIM goals. They had input with regard to what the FIM goals were, 
how performance was to be measured, and how rewards would be distributed; and their 
involvement was perceived to increase the expectancy that the FIM goals could be attained. 
These results suggest that the clarity and consistency in the measurement process are 
important in upholding the perception of fairness. Also, the contractors and consultants felt 
that their motivation was promoted by the democratic team decision-making process at the 
workshops to distribute the incentive reward based on fee proportions. The workshops gave 
them a sense of ownership of the FIM goals and the measurement process, as they had 
actively participated in their development.  
 
Equitable Risk  
The modified managing contractor contract established the framework for an equitable 
allocation of risk that gave the managing contractor the financial flexibility to commit to the 
FIM goals. Also, the open-book cost negotiation process allowed the client and the managing 
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contractor to establish accurate construction costs, which assisted them in managing the 
project risks—thereby decreasing the potential for construction cost overruns.  
 
The client and managing contractor believed that this driver improved the managing 
contractor’s chance of conserving the contingency sum and allocating adequate resources to 
the project initiatives.  This improved the expectancy that the FIM goals could be achieved. 
The client also felt that by not forcing all of the construction risk onto the managing 
contractor, a less adversarial project environment was achieved. This supported the “best for 
project” culture that they were seeking to promote.  
 
Multiple FIM Goals  
Having multiple FIM performance goals provided the reward participants greater control over 
their performance, as there was a wide range of opportunities to secure the FIM reward. This 
increased goal attainment expectancy. The managing contractor felt that the multiple goal 
system allowed them to focus their effort on achieving the relevant goals according to 
changing project priorities while still having the opportunity to secure at least a proportion of 
the FIM reward amount on offer, which was perceived to be fair.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
A range of positive motivation drivers within advanced procurement approaches have been 
identified. These drivers promoted motivation towards above-BAU goals set by the project 
team. According to the key project participants interviewed, the successful achievement of 
these goals was attributed to: 
 
 “Round table” design and construction management structure in the IMT and ELT  
 Early involvement of the managing contractor and key subcontractors in design stages 
 Relationship management workshops and ongoing relationship workgroup initiatives  
 Value-based criteria tender selection process 
 Potential for future work opportunities for high performance delivery 
 FIM design that involved the participants in the development and performance 
measurement process (through the monthly FIM performance workgroups)  
 Application of a multiple FIM performance goal system  
 
These drivers were perceived to increase the level of commitment to the FIM goals through 
improved expectancy that the team would be able to achieve them. The drivers also impacted 
on the project participants’ perception that the client was fair in how 1) the incentive was 
distributed across the team, 2) the FIM goals were developed, and 3) performance was 
measured.  
 
Although there were drivers identified that related to the incentive measurement and 
distribution design, a significant finding was that the project participants’ motivation towards 
the FIM goals was not heavily influenced by the actual amount of financial incentive reward 
offered. Although the interviewees valued the opportunity to increase their profit margin 
through the FIM reward, their motivation and commitment was more strongly promoted 
through the development of good project relationships and the offer of future work 
opportunities. In summary, the findings suggest that the success of an FIM is dependent on its 
application within a complementary range of positively geared procurement initiatives. 
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Without such positive initiatives, the effectiveness of an FIM in promoting motivation may be 
compromised.  
 
Finally, the case study identified that incorporating FIMs into a positively geared procurement 
approach can advocate a positive perception of the FIM’s intention, increasing its 
effectiveness. This finding suggests that construction clients need to promote financial 
incentives as a supporting tool in the development of the project relationship and not use 
incentives as a mechanism of manipulation.  
 
This paper provides a basis for future exploration of the motivation drivers influencing the 
effectiveness of FIMs. Although the research findings are framed within the context of a 
specific case study, it is expected that the results will apply to a wider range of project 
environments than those presented here. This could include the use financial incentives under 
a similar contract and stakeholder management approach for private sector–funded projects, 
as client-sector did not emerge as an important variable in the case study analysis. 
Nevertheless, future quantitative work is recommended to extend the generalizability and 
validity of findings.  
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